For What It's Worth (A Few Of My Notes) Enjoy

FOSTER v. THE STATE 273 Ga. 555 (544 SE2d 153) (2001)
However, the exercise of that power through the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws is not without limitations. Criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State, they must be read according to the natural and obvious import of their language, and their operation should not be limited or extended by application of subtle and forced interpretations. State v. Johnson, 269 Ga. 370, 371 (1) (499 SE2d 56) (1998).

AKIN v. THE STATE. 249 Ga. App. 412 (548 SE2d 655) (2001)
“A criminal statute's unambiguous words may not be altered by judicial construction in order to extend punishment, however deserving of the punishment the person's conduct may seem.” Waldroup v. State, 198 Ga. 144, 145 (30 SE2d 896) (1944).

AKIN v. THE STATE. 249 Ga. App. 412 (548 SE2d 655) (2001)
“Criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the State, and we cannot resort to subtle and forced constructions to limit or to extend the operation of criminal statutes.” Fleming v. State, 271 Ga. 587, 590 (523 SE2d 315) (1999).

BARRACO v. THE STATE. 252 Ga. App. 25 (555 SE2d 244) (2001)
"Judicial construction is necessary only when a statute is ambiguous; in fact, when the language of a statute is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden.” Fleming v. State, 271 Ga. 587, 589 (523 SE2d 315) (1999).

AKIN v. THE STATE. 249 Ga. App. 412 (548 SE2d 655) (2001)
"The unambiguous words of a criminal statute are not to be altered by judicial construction so as to punish one not otherwise within its reach." State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156, 158 (1) (a) (ii) (419 SE2d 32) (1992).

BAGBY v. THE STATE. 274 Ga. 222 (552 SE2d 807) (2001)
“It is firmly established that criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the State.” Bankston v. State, 258 Ga. 188 (367 SE2d 36) (1988).

ALEXIS v. THE STATE. 273 Ga. 423 (541 SE2d 636) (2001)
The felony offense of obstructing or hindering law enforcement officers is defined by O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 (b), which provides that "whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful discharge of his official duties by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony.

ALEXIS v. THE STATE. 273 Ga. 423 (541 SE2d 636) (2001)
The jury interpreted his speech as just "nonsense," and not a threat, then the speech would not be censurable under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24 as either a misdemeanor or a felony. This is because "to argue with, curse loudly at, or verbally interrupt a police officer while making the arrest of another does not constitute obstruction of a police officer.

ARNOLD v. THE STATE. 249 Ga. App. 156 (545 SE2d 312) (2001)
Finally, as a general rule all circumstances surrounding an arrest are generally admissible. See Peeples v. State, 234 Ga. App. 454, 457-458 (4) (507 SE2d 197) (1998).

BABB v. THE STATE. 252 Ga. App. 518 (556 SE2d 562) (2001)
The evidence here showed that Babb struck his sister once, leaving her face red and swollen. While that evidence may have been sufficient to support any one of the crimes charged, it is not sufficient to support more than one charge. Evidence of physical harm or contact is necessary to prove each of the crimes, and there was only one contact and one resulting harm. Accordingly, the three counts merge as a matter of fact, and the trial court erred in sentencing Babb on two counts. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for action consistent with this opinion. See generally Etchinson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 449, 451 (2) (538 SE2d 87) (2000).

AKIN v. THE STATE. 249 Ga. App. 412 (548 SE2d 655) (2001)
"When a defendant raises an affirmative defense and offers evidence in support thereof, the State has the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291 (2) (519 SE2d 206) (1999)

BACON v. THE STATE. 249 Ga. App. 347 (548 SE2d 78) (2001)
An "affirmative defense" is one in which a defendant admits the act but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it. With an "affirmative defense," the focus no longer becomes the act, itself, since such is admitted. Instead, the State's burden becomes the introduction of evidence that disputes, i.e., "disproves," the defendant's alleged justification/excuse for the act. Brown v. State, 267 Ga. 350, 351 (1) (478 SE2d 129) (1996).

"There is no acceptable reason why the state should have a second opportunity to convince a jury of facts necessary to secure a conviction of a crime. Indeed, one of the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent the state from having such a second chance." Wallace v. Havener, 552 F2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1977).

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-42. False imprisonment under color of legal process
When the arrest, confinement, or detention of a person by warrant, mandate, or process is manifestly illegal and shows malice and oppression, an officer issuing or knowingly and maliciously executing the same shall, upon conviction thereof, be removed from office and punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.

BLANSIT v. THE STATE. 248 Ga. App. 323 (546 SE2d 81) (2001)
"The term force . . . means acts of physical force, threats of death or physical bodily harm, or mental coercion, such as intimidation." Brewer v. State, 271 Ga. 605, 607 (523 SE2d 18) (1999).

BLANSIT v. THE STATE. 248 Ga. App. 323 (546 SE2d 81) (2001)
"Lack of resistance, induced by fear, is force." Gibbins, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 898 (1).

BOONE v. THE STATE. 250 Ga. App. 133 (549 SE2d 713) (2001)
The trial court did not err in refusing to allow Boone to act as co-counsel with his attorney during the hearing on his motion for new trial. Essentially, Boone argues that both he and his attorney should have been able to participate in the hearing on his motion for new trial. We disagree, since the right to such hybrid representation has been abolished in Georgia. Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 622 (3) (340 SE2d 891) (1986); Jones v. State, 171 Ga. App. 184, 185-186 (2) (319 SE2d 18) (1984).

BOONE v. THE STATE. 250 Ga. App. 133 (549 SE2d 713) (2001)
The trial court charged the jury that the defendants were presumed innocent. The trial court then charged as follows:

This presumption remains with the Defendants until it is overcome by the State with evidence which is sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendants are guilty of the offense charged. No person shall be convicted of any crime unless until each element of the crime is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no burden of proof upon the Defendants whatever and the burden never shifts to the Defendants to prove their innocence. However, the State is not required to prove the guilt of accused beyond all doubt or to a mathematical certainty. A reasonable doubt means just what it says. It is a doubt of a fair-minded, impartial juror honestly seeking the truth. It is a doubt based upon common sense and reason. It does not mean a vague or arbitrary doubt, but is a doubt for which a reason can be given arising from a consideration of the evidence, a lack of evidence, a conflict in the evidence, or a combination of these things. If after giving consideration to all the facts and circumstances of the case, your minds are wavering, unsettled, or unsatisfied, then that is the doubt of the law and you should acquit the Defendants. But if that doubt does not exist in your minds as to the guilt of the accused, then you would be authorized to convict the Defendants. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the Defendants' guilt. There are very few things in the world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If based on your consideration of the evidence you are firmly convinced that the Defendants are guilty of the crimes charged, you must find them guilty. If on the other hand you think there is a real possibility that they are not guilty, you must give them the benefit of the doubt and find them not guilty. If the State fails to prove the Defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as I just stated, it will be your duty to acquit the Defendants.

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 (a) provides that aggravated assault is committed when a person (1) assaults with intent to murder, rape, or rob; (2) assaults with a deadly weapon or with any instrument which, then used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does cause serious injury; or (3) discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle toward a person.

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395 (a) It shall be unlawful for any driver of a vehicle willfully to fail or refuse to bring his or her vehicle to a stop or otherwise to flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle or police officer when given a visual or an audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such signal shall be in uniform prominently displaying his or her badge of office, and his or her vehicle shall be appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.

Do you seriously want more? Kool. Here's more. - Shuftin Attachment 780