N.J.S.A. 52:30-2 provides:
"Exclusive jurisdiction in and over any lands so acquired by the United States is hereby ceded to the United States for all purposes except the service of process issued out of any of the Courts of this State in any civil or criminal proceeding."
By the special cession act of June 14, 1938 (L. 1938, c. 354) the State of New Jersey ceded to the United States of America lands in Burlington and Ocean Counties known as Camp Dix. The act reserved to the State concurrent jurisdiction with the United States over said lands for the execution of civil and criminal process and exonerated said lands from all taxes, assessments and other charges levied or imposed under the authority of the State.
Pursuant to the general cession act of March 29, 1907 (L. 1907, c. 19, §§ 1 through 3) the United States of America acquired McGuire Air Force Base. See N.J.S.A. 52:30-1 et seq.
The central thrust of plaintiffs' argument is that the State of New Jersey, by ceding the above lands, ceded "exclusive jurisdiction" to the Federal Government in "all" matters and hence is without authority to administer welfare relief to residents of said military reservations.
Considering the counts of the complaint in reverse order, we must first look at N.J.S.A. 30:4-27, which provides in part:
"A person believed to be mentally ill may be admitted to and hospitalized in any mental hospital in this State in an action brought
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*458 by a person interested in the admission of the patient by reason of relationship or marriage, * * *"
It is undisputed that in each instance alleged in the case at bar the application for commitment was made by a blood relative or a relative by marriage.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-31 provides:
"
A non-resident of this State may be committed to a mental hospital in this State in the same manner as residents may be admitted and committed."
And N.J.S.A. 30:4-57 provides:
"If the patient shall be found to be mentally ill and to have
no legal settlement in any county in this State, the Court may commit him to a mental hospital owned by the State."
A reading of the above statutes clearly indicates that insofar as the commitment of a mentally ill person is concerned,
residence is of no significance.
Certainly, any person living on a United States military base located within Burlington County is either a resident of New Jersey or a non-resident. In any event, he may be committed to a mental hospital under the above statutes. The wording of the statutes is plain and clear and their meaning obvious.
The New Jersey statutory scheme concerning mentally ill persons is consistent with cases in other jurisdictions which have held that the state's power over the mentally ill derives from the necessity of assisting and protecting such individuals and the community, and is, therefore, not confined to persons who are residents of the State.
In the case of Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61, 104 A. 467 (Ct. App. 1918), the court enunciated this policy:
"* * * the jurisdiction of courts of equity to issue writs de lunatico inquierendo is exercised for the protection of the community, and the protection of the person and property of the alleged lunatic, there is no reason why it should be confined to cases in which the unfortunate persons are residents of or have property in
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*459 the state. It is their presence within the limits of the state that necessitates the exercise of the power to protect their persons and the community in which they may be placed * * *" (104 A., at p. 471)
Finally, it should be noted that New Jersey enacted the Interstate Compact on Mental Health in 1956. Pursuant to this act, N.J.S.A. 30:7B-1 et seq., an expeditious method is established for the treatment of the mentally ill and their interstate transfer. N.J.S.A. 30:7B-3 provides:
"(a) Whenever a
person physically present in any party State shall be in need of institutionalization by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency, he shall be eligible for care and treatment in an institution in that State irrespective of his residence, settlement or citizenship qualifications." (Emphasis added.)
The tenor of the law as it exists in this State definitely illustrates that mentally ill and mentally deficient persons located in New Jersey shall receive necessary care and treatment regardless of their residence or citizenship.
The question which disturbs plaintiffs and which requires a determination is whether the cession of the land in question created "exclusive jurisdiction" within the federal enclave so as to preclude inhabitants therein from benefiting from state welfare legislation.
It should be noted that the United States Government is not raising the question of the invasion of its sovereignty. The Government by its amicus curiae brief denies the invasion.
Plaintiffs are enveloping themselves with the federal mantle and arguing that to pay the claimants the relief money would constitute an invasion of federal sovereignty. See Board of Com'rs of County of Arapahoe v. Donohoe, 144 Colo. 321, 356 P.2d 267 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1960) where the court commented on a similar position taken by an appellant and held that a civilian resident of a federal enclave was entitled to be a recipient of relief benefits, and in referring to exclusive jurisdiction said:
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*460 "`Exclusive legislative' jurisdiction does not operate as an absolute prohibition against state laws but has for its purpose protection of federal sovereignty, we conclude that it does not operate to prohibit the payment of relief to a resident of [a military enclave]. The conferring of a benefit required by federal law cannot be construed as an act which undermines the federal sovereignty. Indeed, by paying relief in these circumstances, the federal policy to recognize citizens of the United States is fostered and promoted."
It should be repeated at this point that plaintiffs admit that no federal legislation has been enacted to attend the needs of residents of federal enclaves who fit the category for which our state statutes have made provision, so that such persons would be without benefit of any law for their relief. A comparable situation arose in In Re Kernan, 247 App. Div. 664, 665, 288 N.Y.S. 329 (App. Div. 1936), affirmed 272 N.Y. 560, 4 N.E.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1936), where a mother sought custody of her daughter who was held by respondent father in a federal military enclave where he was an Army officer. The court pointed out that there was an absence of authority for a federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus to determine the custody of the child and that it followed that since jurisdiction to grant relief rested in the first place in the courts of the ceding state (New York) within which the child whose custody was sought was found, it should remain there.
It appears to be settled law that the cession or purchase of territory does not create an absolute exclusive sovereignty within the federal enclave — as contradictory as the term may appear.
The modern view is that the term "exclusive" as used in U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 17, relates to protection of the Federal Government against conflicting regulations. See Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261, 63 S.Ct. 617, 87 L.Ed. 748 (1943); Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285, 63 S.Ct. 628, 87 L.Ed. 761 (1943); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937).
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*461 The fact that the United States acquires exclusive jurisdiction over property purchased with the consent of a state does not necessarily divest the state of all power with respect to it; on the contrary, so long as it in no way interferes with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government, the state may continue to exercise its power. 91 C.J.S. United States § 7.
It seems that state laws passed for the public welfare should be applied to federal enclaves within the state, for the state is best fitted to know the requirements of its particular locality and to deal with them. Such measures, it appears, would not interfere with the function of the Federal Government. See 12 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 80, at p. 92.
The desirability of permitting the state to retain jurisdiction for local purposes involving no interference with performance of governmental duties is becoming more and more evident as the activities of the Federal Government expand; the United States should not be compelled to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all property it acquires. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the public policies of this State as expressed in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1, are illuminative. That statute declares the public policy of New Jersey to be:
"* * * * * * *