The Original R4C in the modern civil era?

[eros]

Another "R4C" with the USDC / DCUS that seems to cause consternation.

The question remains that if the R4C is refused by the courts and they proceed I show this?

"

Upon offense by hostile presentment after the inevitable default by Respondent (including all agents,
principals and any and all offensive presentments), after fair notice by refusal for cause like the above
clerk instruction a certificate of exigent circumstances will be issued pursuant to Rule C(3)(a)(ii)(B)
Arrest Warrant and the clerk will immediately issue an arrest warrant for Respondent or named agent or
principal to be taken into custody for the violations of law. Presentments of any kind from Respondent
or any agent acting for the bankruptcy of the United States through the District may be considered
hostile threat of seizure."

Then I try to have the US Marshall arrest someone? This is the same US Marshal that blocks due process at every turn. At that point I hit a brick wall and say yes your honor the US Marshall is in default, can we wait a bit to see if the Marshall does his duty.

Note: I am not an adjacent provocateur nor do I represent any enterprise other than the man, myself.



R.G the son of J.S.





Note: See R4C below









Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Arivaca [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE

In Propria Persona

All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice







DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ARIZONA


Sheila Terese, Wallen, ) Case No. 95-484-TUC
)
Plaintiff, ) NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:
)
v. ) FRCP Rules 9(a); 9(b);
) 12(b)(1),(2),(4),(5)
United States, )
and Does 1-99, )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________)


COMES NOW Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris, Citizen of Arizona

state and Plaintiff in the above entitled matter (hereinafter

"Plaintiff"), to provide formal Notice to all interested parties

that She has refused William D. Browning's ORDER dated August 15,

1996, for the following causes (refused copy attached).

Her previous NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND PETITION FOR ORDER TO

SHOW CAUSE [cites omitted] JURY TRIAL DEMANDED (hereinafter

"NOTICE OF REMOVAL") was filed with the Clerk of the "DISTRICT

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES", not with the "CLERK U S DISTRICT

COURT", as shown by the Clerk's file stamp dated "AUG 13 1996" on

said NOTICE OF REMOVAL (see copy attached). The Clerk of Court

erred by stamping Plaintiff's NOTICE OF REMOVAL in this manner.

See FRCP Rule 9(b).


Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 1 of 6


Furthermore, Mr. Browning is not presiding over the action

now proceeding in the District Court of the United States

("DCUS"), nor has Mr. Browning demonstrated that he has any

jurisdiction in said DCUS over the subject matter, or over the

Person of the Plaintiff, in the above entitled action. See FRCP

Rules 12(b)(1),(2),(4), and (5). Accordingly, without the

requisite jurisdiction having been demonstrated as a matter of

record, he has no authority to deny any of Plaintiff's pleadings,

motions, or demands as filed in the DCUS or in the USDC, except

to dismiss the alleged criminal action for want of jurisdiction,

as required by Law.

Mr. Browning, as an Article IV judge, is a "taxpayer" whose

compensation is diminished during his continuance in office. See

Internal Revenue Code, Section 7701(a). As such, Mr. Browning

cannot preside over any proceeding in a District Court of the

United States ("DCUS"), because to do so violates Article III,

Section 1, of the Constitution for the United States of America,

as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), to wit:

The Judges ... shall ... receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.

[Art. III, Sec. 1, U.S. Constitution, emphasis added]


The United States has never demonstrated jurisdiction, as a

matter of record, to bring any criminal case against the

Plaintiff in the United States District Court ("USDC"). On the

contrary, Plaintiff's NOTICE AND DEMAND TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (hereinafter "NOTICE AND DEMAND") and Her

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT (hereinafter "MEMORANDUM OF LAW"),

i.e. the USDC, plainly prove that the USDC, as distinct and

different from the DCUS, has no criminal jurisdiction whatsoever

to prosecute Plaintiff, unless the alleged crime was committed

within the federal zone. See cites in Plaintiff's NOTICE AND

DEMAND and MEMORANDUM OF LAW.


Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 2 of 6


Mr. Browning also claims to have "denied" two (2) separate

NOTICE's AND DEMAND's FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE, filed

pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d), to wit:

(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.
[Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d)]
[emphasis added]


Said Rule leaves no room for any judicial discretion in the

matter of the evidence submitted thereby. The language of the

terms "when mandatory" and "a court shall take judicial notice"

is indicative of their imperative meaning. Mr. Browning has no

authority whatsoever to "deny" mandatory judicial notice when

invoked pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Furthermore, as a matter of evidence, Plaintiff enjoys the

fundamental Right to incorporate by reference all prior pleadings

filed or lodged in the USDC, no matter who filed them, as if

those pleadings were set forth fully in Her NOTICE OF REMOVAL.

Plaintiff argues that, for Mr. Browning to deny this essential

evidentiary material in the above entitled action is to obstruct

justice, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1506 , to wit:

1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies,
or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other
proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any
judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect;
...
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
[18 U.S.C. 1506]


Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 3 of 6


Moreover, the alleged United States Attorneys who attempted

to bring a criminal action against Plaintiff in the USDC have

failed to demonstrate on record any power of attorney to

represent the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] in said action; the

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA have not been shown on record to have

any standing to bring a criminal action before the USDC; and the

USDC has not been shown to have any criminal jurisdiction over a

crime alleged to have been committed inside the state zone (the

Arizona Republic) and outside the federal zone.

Lastly, Mr. Browning's ORDER was improperly served upon

Plaintiff via United States Mail, because it was addressed to:

Sheila Terese Wallen [sic]
PO Box 335 [sic]
Arivaca, AZ 85601 [sic]

Plaintiff has previously notified all interested parties that She

will refuse all mail unless it is directed to the mailing

location as shown on the face page of this pleading. Plaintiff

hereby reiterates Her intent to refuse all U.S. Mail which

exhibits "AZ" or unqualified zip codes and which fails to exhibit

her proper mailing location as shown supra, and of Her intent to

receive (but not necessarily accept) all U.S. Mail which is

directed to Her proper mailing location.

Notice to agents is notice to principals.

[eros]

Some interesting information for review


More to the merits, legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235, 242?243 (1850); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434, 447 (1871); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 655 (1873); Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877); Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Claiborne?Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); and Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The U.S. Courts of Appeal are Article III federal courts [cites omitted here].
In Marathon supra, Justice Brennan for the plurality reasoned that Congress could create legislative courts without Article III protections in only three limited settings: (1) territorial courts, (2) courts martial, and (3) courts deciding disputes involving public rights that Congress created in the first instance. Thus, by treating the 50 States as federal Territories and by creating federal citizenship as a municipal franchise, Congress could effectively “broadcast” into those States a legislative court that routinely proceeds without Article III protections! See the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27?30, April 9, 1866 A.D. In the legislative USDC, those protections are options, not mandates, particularly when the extension statutes supra are also routinely ignored.


(a)The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, sixteen judges who shall constitute a court of record known as the United States Court of Federal Claims. The court is declared to be a court established under article I of the Constitution of the United States.

(b)The President shall designate one of the judges of the Court of Federal Claims who is less than seventy years of age to serve as chief judge. The chief judge may continue to serve as such until he reaches the age of seventy years or until another judge is designated as chief judge by the President. After the designation of another judge to serve as chief judge, the former chief judge may continue to serve as a judge of the court for the balance of the term to which appointed.